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_ t_ _; _ ' if 
The scientific community is being con- 
fronted by public concerns that freely 
available scientific information may 
be exploited by terrorists. Differing points 
of view among scientists threaten to com- 
plicate discussion intended to address these 
concerns. Skepticism of the existence, 
breadth, and severity of the threat posed by 
would-be bioweaponeers i  compounded by 
the failure to find clear evidence of biolog- 
ical weapons in Iraq. Also, some even ques- 
tion the extent to which open-source scien- 
tific material contributes to the threat. 
Recent public discussions regarding the 
potential for open-source science to enable 
bioterrorist activities have occurred in a vac- 
uum, without examples of"real-world" ac- 
tivity. This is largely because the need for na- 
tional security professionals to safeguard 
sources inculcates a culture of secrecy unlike 
the openness of the life science community. 
One potential contribution of the nation- 
al security community is the opportunity, al- 
beit limited, to educate scientists regarding 
current and emerging threats through unclas- 
sified case studies. The following brief de- 
scription of some recent findings provides 
insight into activities of potential exploiters 
and emphasizes the importance of 
closer interaction between the scien- 5 
tific and security communities. 
Documents recovered from an al- ! 
Qaida training camp in Afghanistan - 
(I) in 2001 have shed light on proce- - 
dures and methodologies used by al- - 
Qaida in its efforts to establish a bio- 
logical warfare (BW) program. Individuals 
involved in this effort apparently relied on 
scientific research and information obtained 
collegially from public and private sources 
(see figure, above right) (2). 
Books found at the camp describe State- 
sponsored BW activities and outline the his- 
J. B. Petro is with the Joint Military Intelligence College, 
Bolling AFB, Washington, DC 20340 5100; D. A. Relman 
is with the Departments of Microbiology & Immunology, 
and of Medicine, Stanford University School of Medicine, 
Stanford, CA 94305, and with Veterans Affairs, Palo Alto 
Health Care System, Palo Alto, CA 94304, USA. 
*To whom correspondence should be addressed. 
E-mail: jbpetro@hotmail.com 
so may rely upon dual-use information. 
With publications from nearly 50 years 
ago, a marginally skilled terrorist could pro- 
duce a crude agent for use in a limited bioter- 
ror attack. However, using more recently pub- 
lished research findings and procedures, ca- 
sualty rates associated with such an incident 
would increase dramatically. Thus, our inabil- 
ity to restrict access to already published re- 
search in no way absolves the sci- 
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isolating, culturing, identifying, 
and producing bacteria, includ- 
ing Bacillus anthracis and 
Clostridium botulinum. Hand- 
written letters and BW primers 
found together at the same site 
suggest hat al-Qaida's 
BW initiative included 
recruitment of individ- "^ J ,^§*t. @ *
uals with Ph.D.-level 
A d 4 
expertlse who sup- 11>o11w^g** 
ported planning and "-^** 
Te *We,1A1 
*, * or , ig;tt*btWa tb ws acqulsluon eIIorts Y X Wq. 
their familiarity with 
the scientific commu- Documen1 
nity. When specific al-Qaida 
information was not Names an 
available in print, al- been remo 
Qaida scientists ap- 
and national security 
communities of our 
X responsibility to ad- 
dress future findings 
of concern. 
The life science 
! community should 
take the lead in part- 
nering with national 
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(5). Furthermore, sci- 
! e.M 
I' -- 11%j%__|X 
ea up;n \s *9} o 
: £^:ttsonstcu * ^ ut$8t X 
_t,.,W,W,,> k,zi^. 
\% 6 ltt wt, ^, , +, ,, , 
m.v.t AuY\s .J - ,<. aUA. s.t^'su. 
t.p. t .. ... .. 
*% >.i. M.t.&i t 8 . ;*; ; 4 
W h#4*t ;. ; t v #*:X WS . z 
. , . , .... 9 ., r 
. , b s - . e 
a-_. . . 
; . .. . .. ,.
t..n4. .#.CEi\ .. iW^,;. WL.. 5.; ....%... 
th L'''t+*'"L' "W%}. tWi^W\. 
¢, ,¢.i3 .tii. $. -.s 
K .Z____ _ 
L 
*. wi* u w.*. , 
,twiiiXo*tb ,n 
bgtFdlUslX llif gthiWi@ tibti f 
-5:k ;sw_t 
nf S; J. Vtig"XS iw w 45',t i7.fi4  i.  , 1. -t5 
;*i 5 #.5.t59 ilt d* wA >3 1S; 
5iR^ *ir sp5t lAt i 51* 
i'iW tM. 
4 t l4#i[ti#\ iiNl' Zi'. kf 
"' . .dAS . _ t_ Ais Xl_.s.8S ,,*:*:.a.i j ...... Ail_ . _A ;l , 
s1i' "* yK P it"b"lt. fl 
Uf t:L *4 t* l+PWvk 
ltlfftl}a*&Z^aa** 
B entists can help ensure secunty pro- 
fessionals maintain a working 
at an lmowledge of cutting-edge tools and 
cility. data with national secunty implica- 
have tions. Such a partnership should in- 
clude scientists who are given secu- 
nty clearance arld national secunty 
participants that represent he spectrum of 
relevant agencies with a strong backgrourld 
and taining in the life sciences (6). 
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parently took advantage of symposia where 
they could obtain tips and techniques 
m directly from unsuspecting re- 
searchers (2). The letter show (fig-
- ure, above) reveals plans to acquire 
- bacterial strains, vaccines, produc- 
_ tion equipment, raining, and expert- 
_ ise. The scientific community needs 
to be aware of this kind of activity. 
Identification of a recently constructed labo- 
ratory (3) with equipment and supplies that 
could be used to produce biological agents 
within a few kilometers of the site where the 
BW-related ocuments were found strongly 
suggests that al-Qaida proceeded beyond 
simply reviewing "dual-use" literature. 
Like al-Qaida, the Japanese terrorist 
group Aum Shinrikyo sought to develop an 
intrinsic BW program; these efforts are a 
dangerous departure from the activities of 
other groups, which historically have 
sought to acquire completed weapons or 
produce crude preparations of toxins and 
chemicals (4). Other groups that pursue an 
independent BW program in the future al- 
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Re: Freedom of Information Act Request
Dear Mr. Richardson:
This is a request under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552.
I request that a copy of the following documents [or documents containing the following
information] be provided to me: al-Qaida documents discovered by U.S. forces in
Afghanistan that pertain to the research materials referenced in the Petro and Relman
article “Understanding Threats to Scientific Openness” published in the 12 December
2003 issue of Science.  Should portions of these documents be deemed too sensitive to be
released, I am requesting all releasable materials to be appropriately appended and
provided.
In order to help determine my status to assess fees, you should know that I am xxx
(Requestors should indicate their professional status and reason for requesting the
material).
I am aware that I am entitled to make this request under the Freedom of Information Act,
and if your agency response is not satisfactory, I am prepared to make an administrative
appeal. Please indicate to me the name of the official to whom such an appeal should be
addressed.
I am aware that if my request is denied I am entitled to know the grounds for this denial.
I request a waiver of all fees for this request. Disclosure of the requested information to
me is in the public interest because it is likely to contribute significantly to public
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